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I. Introduction
In Navajo Nation v. United States Forest Service1 the Ninth Circuit sitting en
banc overturned an earlier three-member panel holding.2  Plaintiffs’ ensuing 
petition to the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari was recently denied.3  The 
initial circuit panel’s decision held that plaintiffs – five federally-recognized 
Indian tribes, several individual tribal leaders and medicine men, the Sierra 
Club, the Center for Biological Diversity and the Flagstaff Action Network – 
established during an eleven-day bench trial that the proposed expansion of 
a privately-operated ski resort on federal land, including plans for 
snowmaking from reclaimed wastewater, constituted an impermissible 
prohibition on the Indian plaintiffs’ free exercise of religion.4  The U.S. Forest 
Service had approved the ski resort expansion, located on a mountain in the 
Coconino National Forest in Arizona that is held deeply sacred according to 
each of the Indian plaintiffs’ tribal religions.5  Navajo I also held that the 
proposed expansion violated the National Environmental Policy Act6 
(“NEPA”) due to the Forest Service’s failure to adequately address potential 
dangers posed to children and others who might ingest artificial snow that is 
made entirely from reclaimed wastewater.7 
This comment examines both the Indian plaintiffs’ free exercise claims, 
brought under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”),8 and the 
NEPA challenge, and then views the case in the broader context of ongoing 
cultural misperceptions.  Beyond the immediate conflict over snowmaking 
with reclaimed wastewater on the San Francisco Peaks, Navajo II marks 
another prolonged episode in centuries of confusion among the courts, 
Congress and the administrative agencies concerning Indian religious use of 
public lands, lands usually obtained by the United States in the first place 
1. 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, __ U.S. __; 129 S.Ct. 2763 (2009)
(hereinafter “Navajo II”). 
2. Id. at 1080.
3. 129 S.Ct. 2763 (2009).
4. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 479 F.3d 1024, 1029 (9th Cir. 2007)
(hereinafter “Navajo I”), aff’d in part, vacated in part by 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008). 
5. Id.
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (1969).
7. 479 F.3d at 1060.  However, construction of a fourteen-mile pipeline and
pumping operation to move wastewater up the mountain for use in snowmaking is 
by no means certain to proceed, since the EIS approved by the Forest Service covers 
only the ski resort property, close to the summit of the Peaks.  Upon the Court’s 
denial of plaintiffs’ petition, their attorney indicated that opposition to the project 
would likely continue.  Associated Press/Felicia Fonseca, Court Won’t Hear Sacred 
Mountain Case, RezNetNews, June 8, 2009, http://www.reznetnews.org/article/court-
wont-hear-sacred-mountain-case-35140 (last visited June 16, 2009). 
8. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb (1993).
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from the tribes seeking to exercise their religious freedom.  Besides 
clarifying the application of RFRA and its First Amendment jurisprudence to 
the use of traditionally significant Indian lands now held by the federal 
government, the Court could have taken up this case as an opportunity to 
note the need for a concrete legislative remedy that ensures tribes will have 
meaningful consultation and participation in federal land use decisions that 
affect their historically important religious and cultural sites.   
The modern experience is not devoid of federal agency consultation 
with affected tribes, but neither is there any law that ensures consultation 
on religious land use issues will occur at all.  A federal policy favoring 
harmonious construction of statutes relating to religious freedom and 
environmental policy could form the basis of such legislation. 
Environmentally precautionary land use strategies that comply with existing 
environmental statutes are often compatible with traditional tribal religious 
uses of that land.9  The new law codifying such a policy could work to apply 
this approach to federal land management decisions that affect traditionally 
significant Indian lands.  Existing executive orders, though not currently 
binding,10 could serve as a starting point for crafting the new law, as could 
the draft Native American Sacred Lands Act (“NASLA”)11. 
In the specific case of Navajo II, the Court could have granted certiorari 
for several reasons.  First, the appeal was decided on rehearing using a 
narrow, coercion-based analysis of the plaintiffs’ religious freedom claims 
that pre-dates RFRA.12  In addition, and as the three-member panel correctly 
held, plaintiffs’ NEPA claim concerning the danger posed by ingestion of 
artificial snow made from recycled wastewater was sufficiently addressed at 
the trial court to merit substantive review on appeal and that claim should 
prevail.13  Above all, this case would afford an opportunity for the Court to 
clarify for the circuits the proper application of its standards post-RFRA as 
applied to federal land use challenges that concern Native American 
religious freedom, and to highlight the need for a comprehensive policy 
solution.  I believe the Court had grounds to reverse the en banc decision on 
these bases, though its religious freedom analysis would have to hew to a 
particularly narrow path to successfully navigate the statute, the spirit of the 
9. See, e.g., Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000); Wyo. Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 383 F.3d 1241 
(10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 811 (2005). 
10. See Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866, 882 (D. Ariz. 2006)
(citing Exec. Order Nos. 12,898; 13,007; 13,175); aff’d on reh’g, 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 
2008). 
11. H.R. 5155, 107th Cong. (2002).
12. 535 F.3d at 1069-1073.  Indeed, the decision compounds confusion
concerning interpretation of RFRA.  See, e.g., Eric D. Yordy, Fixing Free Exercise:  A 
Compelling Need to Relieve the Current Burdens, 10 Hastings Const. L. Q. 191 (2008).   
13. 479 F.3d at 1049, 1059.
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First Amendment and all of the Court’s own precedents. 
II. Factual Background
Since time immemorial all of the Indian tribal plaintiffs have held the
San Francisco Peaks (hereinafter “the Peaks”) to be sacred.14  According to 
the culture and religion of the 225,000 member Navajo Nation, the Peaks are 
considered to be the “Mother of the Navajo People;” the whole of the Peaks 
is the holiest of shrines in the Navajo way of life.15  Plaintiff Norris Nez 
creates medicine bundles for individual Navajo tribal members, using plants 
and soil he collects on the Peaks; these bundles are central to tribal 
members’ daily religious practice.16   
Spiritual deities of the Hopi, called Kachina, bring water, snow and life 
to the Hopi people; the Hopi direct their prayers and thoughts to the Peaks, 
a point in the physical world that defines the Hopi universe.17  Certain 
plaintiffs testified that the Peaks have already been desecrated by the 
Snowbowl ski resort operations, and that the desecration will intensify if the 
expansion is carried out.18  Plaintiff Bill Bucky Preston testified that the 
presence of the Snowbowl on the Peaks presently prevents him from 
conducting religious activities in the area, although he does currently collect 
plants and wildlife on the Peaks.19   
For the Havasupai, the Peaks are the origin of the human race.20  They 
believe, though the trial court did not find, that the proposed use of 
reclaimed wastewater at the ski resort would contaminate water in Havasu 
Creek and desecrate ceremonial items, food, water and fallen trees that they 
currently gather from the Peaks, as they have done for hundreds of years.21  
The Hualapai plaintiffs believe that water travels down the mountain from 
the Peaks to areas where they collect water for ceremonial purposes and for 
healing the sick.22   
Some plaintiffs testified to their belief that the ongoing operation of 
the ski resort desecrates the Peaks and has caused many disasters and 
conflicts in the world, both man-made and natural.23  Some plaintiffs 
testified to their belief that it is their spiritual obligation to care for their 
14. Id. at 1048.
15. 408 F. Supp. 2d at 888-89.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 894.
18. 535 F.3d at 1064.
19. 408 F. Supp. 2d at 890-91.
20. Id. at 892.
21. Id. at 892-93.
22. Id. at 891.
23. 535 F.3d at 1064.
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traditional lands, including the Peaks, and to ensure the continued health of 
those lands as well as the plants and animals found there.24   
The Forest Service recognizes the Peaks as Traditional Cultural 
Property, a place associated with the cultural practices or beliefs of a living 
community and eligible to be listed on the National Historic Register.25  The 
19,000-acre Kachina Peaks Wilderness area on the Peaks is managed by the 
Forest Service for wilderness values.26  The Kachina Peaks Wilderness area 
surrounds the Snowbowl ski resort on three sides. 27   
The Snowbowl is a private enterprise, currently operated on 777 acres 
of land managed by the U.S. Forest Service; the Peaks support other public 
recreational activities besides skiing.28  The Snowbowl has been used as a ski 
area since 1938, with expansion following similar litigation upon approval of 
the then-owner’s Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”).29  In Wilson v. 
Block,30 the D.C. Circuit applied the First Amendment to uphold the EIS and 
expansion against a challenge by the Navajo, the Hopi and local ranchers.31  
That expansion did not include any use of reclaimed wastewater.32  The 
Snowbowl currently operates on the EIS that was approved in the Wilson 
litigation.33  The current Forest Service plan provides for 205 acres of skiable 
terrain comfortably supporting up to 2,825 skiers at one time.34 
Snowfall in the desert climate of northern Arizona can be erratic; ski 
days in recent seasons have ranged from four days in 2001-2002 to 139 days 
in 2004-2005.35  The trial court concluded that “snowmaking is needed to 
maintain the viability of the Snowbowl” as a recreational resource.36  In the 
Peaks’ high desert environment, the only viable source of water sufficient to 
provide the 1.5 million gallons per day required for commercial snowmaking 
is reclaimed wastewater from the city of Flagstaff.37  Intervenor Arizona 
Snowbowl Resort (hereinafter “ASR”) proposes to construct a fourteen-mile 
long pipeline to pump the wastewater thousands of feet uphill from Flagstaff 
24. Id. at 1099 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
25. 408 F. Supp. 2d at 883.
26. Id. at 870.
27. Id.
28. 535 F.3d at 1064.
29. Id.; 408 F. Supp. 2d at 902.
30. 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
31. 535 F.3d at 1065.
32. Id. at 1065.
33. 408 F. Supp. 2d at 870 n.2.
34. Id. at 886.
35. 479 F.3d at 1030.
36. 535 F.3d at 1065; 408 F. Supp. 2d at 907.
37. 408 F. Supp. 2d at 874.
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to the ski resort.38 
The treated sewage effluent meets Arizona’s requirements for 
“reclaimed water” but it is not pure; treatment may remove up to 99.999% of 
fecal coliform bacteria, but there will be “detectable levels” of other bacteria, 
and the water will contain viruses and “many unidentified and unregulated 
residual organic contaminants.”39  The wastewater derives from private and 
public water customers in Flagstaff, including hospitals and mortuaries, 
sources of particular concern to plaintiffs due to strict religious guidelines 
concerning contact with the dead.40  The effluent is approved for irrigation, 
but not for ingestion.41  Precautions must be taken to avoid human contact 
or consumption.42  However, the wastewater is approved by the Arizona 
Department of Environmental Quality (“ADEQ”) for snowmaking.43 
If the tribes’ sacred mountain is contaminated, they may still visit it, 
and they may still gather plants and water and other objects.44  But, 
according to testimony concerning their accepted sincere beliefs, those 
objects will not be the same; they will no longer be sacred.45  Consequently 
the plaintiffs’ medicine and prayers will not be strong.46  Certain Navajo and 
Hopi plaintiffs testified that if the snowmaking with recycled wastewater 
went forward, they would no longer be able to perform certain ceremonies.47  
Snowmaking with reclaimed wastewater would therefore “prevent them from 
engaging in religious conduct or having a religious experience,” which the 
Ninth Circuit has held elsewhere establishes a prima facie case under 
RFRA.48  Consequently, those plaintiffs would be prohibited from practicing 
their religion and from preserving it for future generations.   
The tribes’ religious need to keep their mountain in its 
uncontaminated natural state is compatible with the wilderness 
management criteria that apply to the federal land on the Peaks surrounding 
the Snowbowl.  The trial court’s findings included facts that the surrounding 
Kachina Peaks Wilderness is protected from further development, and that 
the Hopi Plaintiffs agreed that wilderness designation and management 
38. Id. at 885-86.
39. 479 F.3d at 1038.
40. Id. at 1040.
41. Id. at 1038.
42. Id.
43. 535 F.3d at 1065.
44. Id. at 1063.
45. Id.; 408 F. Supp. 2d at 887.
46. 408 F. Supp. 2d at 890.
47. 479 F.3d at 1043.
48. Id. at 1042 (citing Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948, 949 (9th Cir. 1995)); Graham
v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1987).
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values had provided a benefit to Hopi culture.49 
III. Grounds for Reversal
A. NEPA Challenge Concerning Ingestion of Snow Made
from Reclaimed Wastewater.
1. The Challenge Should Be Upheld on its Merits.
In Navajo I, Judge Fletcher’s opinion explored in detail each of the 
NEPA claims raised by all plaintiffs,50 and ultimately reversed the trial 
court’s summary judgment orders to uphold one of those six claims:  that 
the final EIS did not adequately address the danger presented by ingestion 
of snow made from reclaimed wastewater.51  The trial court had accepted the 
Forest Service’s reliance on ADEQ’s determination that the wastewater was 
permitted for direct reuse in snowmaking.52  However, the trial court’s 
decision did not discuss the fact that ADEQ “specifically disapproved human 
ingestion of such water.”53  In fact, ADEQ requires conspicuous signage 
where such wastewater is in use, to guard against consumption.54  Full 
immersion, ingestion and misting are all prohibited uses of the reclaimed 
wastewater.55  Navajo I concluded that the Forest Service’s response to 
comments on the draft EIS did not adequately address this issue56 or 
ADEQ’s apparently conflicting regulations.57  The Forest Service did not 
explain what consideration ADEQ gave to the issue of ingestion or why it 
relied on ADEQ’s consideration in making its decision to approve 
snowmaking with reclaimed wastewater on the Peaks.58 
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)59 does not require a court to 
agree with an administrative agency’s conclusions in reviewing a decision 
under NEPA.60  However, the reviewing court is charged with the 
49. 408 F. Supp. 2d at 899.
50. 479 F.3d at 1048-59.
51. Id. at 1054.
52. 408 F. Supp. 2d at 876.
53. 479 F.3d at 1050.
54. Id.
55. Id. (citing Ariz. Admin. Code § R18-9-704(G)(2) (2005)).
56. Id. at 1052-53 (citing the Forest Service’s response that it assumed the
danger was fully considered “[b]ecause ADEQ approved the use.”). 
57. Id. at 1054-55.
58. Id. at 1053-54.
59. 5 U.S.C. §§701-706.
60. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 349 F.3d 1157, 1166 (9th Cir.
2003) (an EIS must simply contain a “reasonably thorough discussion” of significant 
aspects of its action’s environmental consequences). 
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responsibility for ensuring that the agency took “a hard look” at the likely 
environmental impact of the action, acknowledged any related risks and 
explained its reasoning in proceeding with its action.61  In this case, it is 
difficult to see how the Forest Service took a “hard look” when it apparently 
did not address the conflict in ADEQ regulations that simultaneously 
approve the  wastewater for snowmaking but require precautionary 
measures to prevent human contact, immersion or ingestion.  Nor did the 
Forest Service offer an explanation of its reasons for approving the proposal 
for snowmaking with wastewater, despite the lack of evidence that the 
operation would be safe for the public even if children or others should 
ingest the snow made with reclaimed wastewater, become immersed in that 
snow or its meltwater, or if workers at the Snowbowl facility or the public 
should breathe wastewater vapors or mist related to the snowmaking 
operation. 
2. The Issue was Sufficiently Raised at Trial.
Navajo I explained that defendants alleged the plaintiffs had not 
exhausted their administrative remedies with regard to their NEPA claim 
concerning ingestion of snow made with reclaimed wastewater, and that the 
claim was not properly raised in the complaint.62  But, as noted above, the 
Navajo I decision held that the plaintiffs were among those who raised these 
dangers during the administrative process.63  Moreover, as Navajo I correctly 
held, under the notice pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a), the NEPA issue of use of reclaimed wastewater was 
adequately raised by the Navajo plaintiffs64 in their complaint65 and the 
specific danger of ingestion was briefed and argued by the parties at 
summary judgment.66   
Despite the fact that the issue was addressed on the administrative 
record and in trial court proceedings, the Ninth Circuit held in Navajo II that 
because the Navajo plaintiffs had not amended their complaint to 
specifically allege that the final EIS did not adequately address the danger of 
ingestion, it was improperly raised in their summary judgment motion; that 
61. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dep’t of the Navy, 422 F.3d 174, 185 (4th Cir. 2005);
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349. 
62. 479 F.3d at 1048.
63. Id. at 1050, 1052-53.
64. “Navajo plaintiffs” include the Sierra Club, the Flagstaff Activist Network
and the Center for Biological Diversity; see First Amended Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief, No. CV 05 1824 PCT PGR (D. Ariz. June 23, 2005). 
65. Id. at ¶¶ 74-80 (Count 8, FOREST SERVICE FAILED TO TAKE THE
REQUISITE “HARD LOOK” AT THE IMPACTS OF INTRODUCING RECLAIMED WASTE 
WATER TO THE ECOSYSTEM). 
66. 479 F.3d at 1050.
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the trial court declined to rule on it; and that therefore it could not be raised 
in their appeal.  Navajo II appears to be at odds with the facts of the case and 
the law in the Ninth Circuit.   
Generally, a claim that is not raised in dispositive proceedings before a 
district court may not be raised on appeal.67  But that does not mean that a 
complaint in federal court must necessarily rise to the level of factual 
specificity required by procedural rules in many states, or even that an 
appellate court may never consider an issue that was not raised at trial.68  In 
fact, in certain instances, an appellate court may even elect to hear 
arguments that were not presented to a district court.69  But, in this case, the 
Navajo plaintiffs met their pleading burden, received a decision from the 
trial court and properly appealed that decision to the circuit.   
While the trial court’s decision does not use the word “ingest,” it does 
indeed reach a decision on the merits of the claim by Navajo plaintiffs and 
others that the final EIS did not adequately address the environmental 
impacts of snowmaking using reclaimed wastewater.70  Furthermore, the 
Navajo I opinion quoted extensively from the parties’ administrative and trial 
court positions on this issue.71  Evidently those materials were part of the 
record before the Ninth Circuit, and there is no indication in the trial court 
decision, the three-member panel decision or the en banc ruling that any 
party moved to exclude them from the trial court’s or the circuit’s 
consideration.  
Prevailing on their NEPA challenge would not necessarily enable the 
plaintiffs to prevent the Forest Service from ultimately permitting 
snowmaking with reclaimed wastewater at the Snowbowl.  But it would 
require the Forest Service to revisit its EIS process and take the requisite 
hard look72 at the significant environmental impacts presented by using 
67. Calabretta v. Floyd, 189 F.3d 808, 818 (9th Cir. 1999) (claim not presented to
district court in summary judgment proceedings cannot be raised for the first time 
on appeal). 
68. See, e.g., Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941) (“Rules of practice and
procedure are devised to promote the ends of justice, not to defeat them.”)  Accord, 
Bolker v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985) (exceptions exist to the general 
rule that an appellate court will not hear issues not presented at trial). 
69. Marx v. Loral Corp., 87 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Generally, an
appellate court will not consider arguments not first raised before the district court,” 
absent exceptional circumstances (citation omitted)). 
70. 408 F. Supp. 2d at 876.  However, the trial court noted that some
plaintiffs’ contentions under NEPA that the Forest Service did not consider a 
reasonable range of alternatives to the proposed upgrades must be barred from 
judicial review, because those plaintiffs did not properly raise their proposed 
alternatives in the administrative process.  Id. at 875.  These claims were also denied 
in both Navajo I (479 F.3d at 1054-56) and Navajo II (535 F.3d at 1079). 
71. 479 F.3d at 1050-54.
72. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 349.
 
West  Northwest, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 2010 
286 
wastewater.  In this instance, as in other situations where Indians’ free 
exercise of religion is dependent upon the undisturbed quality of their 
traditionally significant federal lands, the NEPA review process does not 
necessarily result in the outcome most protective of the land or the Indians’ 
religious freedom.  But it contributes to a complete investigation of the 
government’s interests in the proposed conflicting use, and affords some 
measure of respect for traditional religious land use by considering 
alternatives that, by virtue of their environmentally precautionary nature, 
can be compatible with the continuation of a tribe’s religious use.  The EIS 
should have been remanded to the Forest Service so that the agency could 
demonstrate on a sufficient record that it took a hard look at ASR’s proposal 
for snowmaking with reclaimed wastewater on the Peaks. 
B. Snowmaking with Reclaimed Wastewater Substantially
Burdens the Indians’ Free Exercise of Religion; the
Forest Service Has Not Identified a Sufficiently
Compelling Interest to Justify that Burden.
“Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of a 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” 
-Const. amend. 1
As with most societies in the developed world, the prevailing concept 
of freedom in the United States is a personal one:  a moveable, individual 
feast of freedom where personal liberties are paramount and wealth is 
perceived materially.  But for Indians, the ability to exercise their personal 
liberties, their right to be themselves, to live and worship freely includes the 
need to be part of a living community in a particular place, to care for 
ancestral lands and ancestors’ bones.73  It encompasses a need to treat all of 
the living and dead relatives with respect - the two-footed ones as well as 
those with fins and wings and hooves.74  It includes the recognition that even 
trespassers on their group’s traditional lands are still their brothers and 
friends.75  Identity is tied to land and group spiritual practice, within an 
overarching understanding of the sacred nature and interrelatedness of all 
things.76  No matter the tribal affiliation, Indian spiritual values and social 
customs tend to be deeply invested in each group’s identity as people of a 
73. See, e.g., William Bradford, Beyond Reparations, 66 Ohio St. L.J. 1 (2005) at 84
n. 409; VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED:  A NATIVE VIEW OF RELIGION 121 (Fulcrum Publ'g
(2003) (1973).
74. DONALD A. GRINDE & BRUCE E. JOHANSEN, ECOCIDE OF NATIVE AMERICA 264
(1995) (citing Onondega Chief Oren Lyons, “We see it as our duty to speak as 
caretakers for the natural world . . . all life is equal, including the four-legged and the 
winged things. . . they too have rights.”) 
75. See Deloria, supra, at 200-201, 210-211.
76. Deloria, supra, at 121, 294-295.
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particular place.77 
Justice Brennan addressed this problem of opposing perceptions in his 
dissent (joined by Justices Blackmun and Marshall) in Lyng v. Northwest Indian 
Cemetery Protective Association, a challenge by northern California Indians to 
Forest Service plans to build a logging road through the Chimney Rock area 
of the Six Rivers National Forest that holds special religious significance for 
them.78  In that case, the Court overturned the Ninth Circuit, holding that the 
government restriction imposed by the logging road on the Indians’ free 
exercise of religion was a permitted infringement, because the government’s 
interest was not outweighed by the burden the road placed on the Indians’ 
free exercise.79  In dissent, Justice Brennan opined that the majority decision 
“incorrectly assumes that Native American belief systems ascribe religious 
significance to land in a traditionally western hierarchical manner.”80   
It is frequently the case in constitutional litigation . . . that courts 
are called upon to balance interests that are not readily 
translated into rough equivalents.  At their most absolute, the 
competing claims that both the Government and Native 
Americans assert in federal land are fundamentally incompatible, 
and unless they are tempered by compromise, mutual 
accommodation will remain impossible.81 
In 1970, Taos Pueblo member Paul Bernal testified in Congress 
concerning the return of Taos Pueblo’s sacred Blue Lake, then under Forest 
Service control, to exclusive tribal control.  He contrasted the government 
and Indian outlooks: 
In all of its programs the Forest Service proclaims the supremacy 
of man over nature; we find this viewpoint contradictory to the 
realities of the natural world and to the nature of conservation. 
Our tradition and our religion require people to adapt their lives 
and activities to our natural surroundings so that men and nature 
mutually support the life common to both.  The idea that man 
must subdue nature and bend its processes to his purposes is 
repugnant to our people.82 
77. Deloria, supra, at 121.
78. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 474
(1988)(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
79. Id. at 450-51.
80. Id. at 474.
81. Id.
82. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the S. Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Congr. (July 9, 1970) (Statement of Mr. Bernal, 
Secretary & Interpreter, Taos Pueblo Council).  See also New Mexico Office of the State 
Historian, http://newmexicohistory.org/filedetails. php?fileID=363.  Eventually, after 
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In short, the U.S. government’s square hole of land use, bounded by 
conquest, treaty, statute and a resource-extractive multiple use policy, fails 
to accommodate the round peg that is the integrated native view of person, 
property, religion and community.  Without gaining some sort of sympathy 
for each other’s outlook, these fundamental differences will continue to 
frustrate any effort to reconcile U.S. and native interests. 
Navajo II asked whether the approved expansion to the ASR operation 
is forbidden by the First Amendment’s Free Exercise of Religion Clause, as 
articulated in RFRA.83  The Ninth Circuit overturned Navajo I relying in large 
part on the pre-RFRA holding in Lyng,84 and contrary to developments in the 
Tenth Circuit and elsewhere in recent years.  When the Ninth Circuit decided 
Navajo II, its narrow reliance on Lyng was misplaced.  This reliance caused it 
to undervalue the emphasis that RFRA places on the two specific cases that 
constitute the Supreme Court’s bedrock Free Exercise framework, Sherbert v. 
Verner 85 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.86 
Aside from the new ASR proposal to manufacture artificial snow from 
reclaimed wastewater, the approved Snowbowl expansion is similar to the 
1980s expansion, and most of the proposed upgrades other than 
snowmaking were already addressed in the current EIS.87  Therefore, the 
primary Free Exercise focus of this comment will be the proposed 
snowmaking operation.  However, because RFRA prescribes a more exacting 
test for permissible restrictions on free exercise than the test employed by 
the Lyng court and followed in Navajo II, as discussed below, it is conceivable 
that the Indian plaintiffs could perhaps have prevailed on their free exercise 
objections to other aspects of the expansion if those claims were also 
properly evaluated under RFRA. 
Before proceeding further it is worth noting that, aside from Lyng, the 
Supreme Court’s modern Free Exercise cases prior to the enactment of RFRA 
served to apply the Constitutional term “prohibit” to factual situations 
where sincere individual believers were faced with a choice between 
following their religion and either receiving a generally available benefit 
(such as unemployment compensation) or avoiding criminal prosecution,88 
more than sixty years’ effort by the Taos Indians (following their agreement to 
renounce title to the town of Taos in exchange for recognition of the validity of their 
title to the lake and the forest lands surrounding Taos Pueblo), Congress granted the 
tribe trust title to its sacred Blue Lake and the entire watershed.  H.B. 471, 91st Cong. 
(1969) (enacted).   
83. 535 F.3d at 1063.
84. Id. at 1071-73.
85. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
86. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
87. 535 F.3d at 1065.
88. See, e.g., Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398; Yoder, 406 U.S. 205; Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693 (1986). 
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rather than any situation where a tribe’s religion was entirely prohibited. 
Nonetheless, dissenting in Lyng, Justice Brennan wrote that land use 
decisions like the Forest Service’s proposed logging road through spiritually 
significant land constituted the “gravest threat” to Native religious practices, 
one that would effectively “destroy” the Indians’ religion.89   
In enacting RFRA Congress sought to prevent the Court’s limits on 
protection against governmental prohibition on free exercise from 
contracting any further than the Court had set that limit in its cases before 
Lyng.90  Under RFRA, the federal government may not “substantially burden” 
the free exercise of religion, whether or not that exercise is compelled by or 
central to the adherent’s system of beliefs.91  Yet, as Justice O’Connor 
observed for the majority in Lyng “[p]rohibit” is still the “crucial word in the 
constitutional text.”92   
In the instant case, Petitioners face a situation even more dire than 
that confronting the religious practitioners in Lyng, a situation that would 
effectively prohibit their religious practice.  If reclaimed wastewater is 
dispersed on the Peaks, that unique and primary shrine will be defiled and 
as a consequence many of the Indians’ important daily ceremonies will lose 
their significance.93  The Navajo II Petitioners do not have the ability to 
worship elsewhere.  Their faith is bound to the particular land of the San 
Francisco Peaks.94   
1. The Court’s Religious Freedom Decisions.
Recognizing the fundamental liberty at stake in a religious freedom 
claim, the Court’s significant twentieth century Free Exercise cases initially 
applied a strict scrutiny test, whereby the government – once its actions are 
demonstrated to restrict free exercise – must show a compelling interest in 
accomplishing or continuing its restrictive action and must demonstrate 
that it is using the least restrictive means possible to achieve its legitimate 
objective in order for a restrictive law to stand.  Applying this test, the Court 
invalidated state laws in both Sherbert and Yoder.   
Sherbert v. Verner held a state’s denial of unemployment compensation 
unconstitutional.95  The applicant was refused benefits because she would 
not accept employment that required her to work on her Sabbath.96  The 
89. 485 U.S. at 458-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb(b)(1).
91. 42 U.S.C. §§2000bb-1(a), 2000bb-2(4), 2000cc-5(7)(A).
92. 485 U.S. at 451; see also Navajo I, 479 F.3d. at 1032.
93. 535 F.3d at 1063.
94. 408 F. Supp. 2d at 890-91.
95. 374 U.S. at 410.
96. Id. at 399.
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Court decided that the Free Exercise Clause prevented the state from forcing 
the applicant to violate her sincere beliefs in order to qualify for 
unemployment benefits, despite its interest in discouraging unemployment 
fraud.97 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder the Court upheld an Amish family’s challenge to 
compulsory education laws.98  The family’s sincerely held beliefs prevented 
them from complying with state law that required them to send their 
teenagers to public school after the eighth grade.99  The Court found it a 
violation of the First Amendment for the state to hold them criminally liable 
for adhering to their beliefs, in spite of the state’s interest in the education 
of its children.100   
But later, in two challenges to federal government actions by Native 
Americans, the Court upheld restrictions on free exercise without applying a 
strict scrutiny test, because it did not find any government “coercion” to act 
contrary to beliefs like the coercion it saw in Sherbert and Yoder.101  As detailed 
below, Congress apparently saw prohibition on free exercise in those cases, 
because it did not agree with the Court’s outcome.  Although Congress did 
not explicitly disapprove any of the Court’s prior decisions, it took legislative 
countermeasures against the Court’s results in those two cases and 
indicated its approval of the compelling interest test as articulated in 
Sherbert and Yoder.102   
Against a Free Exercise challenge, in Lyng the Court upheld Forest 
Service plans to build a logging road through an area of the Six Rivers 
National Forest in northern California that was central to respondent 
Indians’ religious beliefs and ceremonies.103  The Court held that in religious 
challenges to federal land use, plaintiffs must first demonstrate a 
substantial restriction of their religious practice before the Court will subject 
the government’s interests to its customary strict scrutiny test, and it did not 
find that the plaintiffs had met that burden.104   
In a 5-3 decision, although the Court acknowledged that the burden 
the logging road could impose on the Lyng plaintiffs’ religious practice was 
“severe,” it did not find coercion and thus concluded that the burden was 
not heavy enough to trigger the “compelling interest” test previously 
97. Id. at 407, 410.
98. 406 U.S. 205.
99. Id. at 207, 209.
100. Id. at 236.
101. Lyng, 485 U.S. 439; Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
102. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb(a)(5).
103. 485 U.S. at 442.
104. Id. at 450.
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employed in Sherbert and Yoder.105  Turning a stunningly blind eye to the 
manner in which plaintiffs’ sacred lands came into the government’s 
possession in the first place, Justice O’Connor wrote for the majority: 
The Constitution does not permit government to discriminate 
against religions that treat particular physical sites as sacred . . . . 
Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area, 
however, those rights do not divest the Government of its right to 
use what is, after all, its land.106 
Finding parallels to its recent decision in Bowen v. Roy,107 where Native 
American plaintiffs’ Free Exercise challenge to the government’s conduct of 
its “own internal affairs” (requiring that they obtain a social security number 
for their daughter) was denied, the Court also declined to apply strict 
scrutiny to its evaluation of the Forest Service decision in Lyng.108  Shortly 
thereafter, in Employment Division, Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith the 
Court again declined to apply a strict scrutiny test and rejected the Free 
Exercise claims of Native American plaintiffs who lost their jobs and were 
denied unemployment benefits because of religious use of peyote.109   
The Court has not had occasion to consider a Free Exercise claim 
pertaining to Native American religious freedom on federal land since it 
decided Lyng and Smith.  Despite some similarities between Navajo II and 
Lyng, certain key facts are distinguishable:  Navajo II concerns land held 
sacred by many tribes and affects those tribal members’ daily religious 
practice,110 rather than affecting occasional religious use by a few 
practitioners which was the issue in Lyng.  In addition, the primary 
beneficiary of the government’s interest in promoting skiing on this 
mountain is a private business enterprise, not the federal government itself 
through its ability to carry out the Forest Service multiple use policy by 
building a road to harvest timber as was the issue in Lyng.111  Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit’s reliance on Lyng led it to a result in Navajo II that Congress did not 
intend, evidenced by the legislative actions that followed Lyng and Smith, as 
well as the plain language of RFRA and the First Amendment. 
2. Congressional Reaction to Lyng and Smith.
In recent decades, Congress and the judiciary would appear to have 
switched ideological hats from the days when Chief Justice Marshall’s 1832 
105. Id. at 447.
106. Id. at 453.
107. 476 U.S. at 693.
108. 485 U.S. at 448.
109. 494 U.S. 872.
110. See, e.g., 408 F. Supp. 2d at 889.
111. 535 F.3d at 1064.
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opinion affirmed Cherokee treaty rights in Worcester v. Georgia,112 only to have 
Congress enact the Indian Removal Act.113  In response to Lyng, Congress 
passed the California Wilderness Act, preserving much of the affected area of 
Six Rivers National Forest from logging or related development.114  In a 
separate bill, Congress de-funded the proposed logging road.115  Finally, 
after Smith was decided Congress enacted RFRA.116  It also legalized religious 
use of peyote in the Native American Church.117   
RFRA explicitly approves the Sherbert/Yoder compelling interest test, 
seeking to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise is 
substantially burdened.118  Though RFRA did not specifically disapprove any 
of the Court’s past decisions, it related to the Court that Congress found the 
Sherbert/Yoder compelling interest test to be a “workable test for striking 
sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior 
governmental interests.”119  Taking RFRA together with the California 
Wilderness and Smith River National Recreation Acts and the legalization of 
religious peyote use, Congress changed the Court’s resolution of both Lyng 
and Smith, to the benefit of Native Americans’ free exercise of religion.  In 
the case of Lyng, the California Wilderness Act also preserved thousands of 
acres of northern California wilderness from environmentally destructive 
logging.120 
3. Current Appellate Court Interpretations.
Meanwhile, since Smith and the enactment of RFRA, the circuits have 
interpreted Court precedent and Congress’ instructions in different ways. 
With Navajo II, the Ninth Circuit retains Lyng as its strict guidepost in federal 
land management decisions that affect free exercise, and declines to apply 
the compelling interest test where it does not find that plaintiffs specifically 
demonstrate coercion into actions contrary to their beliefs.121  
Other courts have taken a different route.  In the Tenth Circuit, a 
district court recently considered that circuit’s earlier RFRA cases in support 
112. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
113. Indian Removal Act of May 28, 1830, Ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1832).
114. California Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-425.
115. Smith River National Recreation Area Act, 16 U.S.C. §460bbb.
116. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb.
117. American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-341 (as
amended by Native American Free Exercise of Religion Act of 1994, Pub .L. No. 103-
344). 
118. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb(b)(1).
119. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb(a)(5).
120. Pub. L. No. 98-425.
121. 535 F.3d at 1071.  See also Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207 (9th
Cir. 2008). 
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of its decision not to require “coercion” in order to find a substantial burden, 
when it preliminarily enjoined construction of a building on military land 
that plaintiffs allege would burden their free exercise of religion.122  Other 
recent cases in both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have successfully survived 
Establishment challenges by commercial and recreational interests where 
the Forest Service worked together with tribes to protect sacred sites, even 
to the extent of enforcing some restrictions on public access to the sites, as 
discussed below.123   
It is interesting to note that the Wilson trial court decision (permitting 
the earlier expansion of Snowbowl operations) actually cited to the Lyng 
trial court decision (that upheld an injunction prohibiting construction of the 
Six Rivers logging road) for the proposition that the First Amendment does 
not obligate the government to “control or limit public access to public 
lands in order to facilitate” religious practices.124  Although this statement 
may not entirely resolve the effluent problem in the current case, it seems to 
be a reading of the First Amendment that fits comfortably with the 
resolution of Wilson, the Court’s holding in Lyng and the ultimate 
preservation of the Six Rivers forest as well as RFRA, in approaching the 
problem from the Establishment Clause end of the spectrum.   
Government lands are “public lands,” belonging to the government in 
trust for all the people, and, as the Wilson trial court pointed out, the Forest 
Service is not obligated to restrict non-Indians’ access.  But it is also 
obligated to ensure that it does not prohibit the Indians’ free exercise.  Of 
course, plaintiffs here are not necessarily asking for a limitation on public 
access.  What they are seeking is to avoid a government-imposed limit on 
the nature of their own religious use. 
4. The Burden/Compelling Interest Analysis.
Because the Ninth Circuit’s narrow inquiry into the burden in Navajo II 
is in conflict with law in the Tenth Circuit, as discussed above, I believe it 
was ripe for review.  While this narrow construction of Sherbert/Yoder may not 
necessarily be flawed in the Court’s opinion, the Court’s guidance on the 
proper application of the Sherbert/Yoder compelling interest test post-RFRA 
could provide valuable instruction for federal agencies faced with future land 
122. Comanche Nation v. U.S., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73283 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 23,
2008).  See also Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon v. Impson, 503 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(reversing dismissal of Passamaquoddy tribal members’ NEPA and other challenges 
to BIA approval of lease of tribal beach lands of traditional religious significance for 
development of  a liquefied natural gas terminal). 
123. Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d 814; Wyo. Sawmills, 383 F.3d 1241; Natural Arch & Bridge
Soc’y v. Alston, 98 Fed. Appx. 711 (10th Cir. 2004), cert. denied sub nom. DeWaal v. Alston, 
543 U.S. 1145; Access Fund v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 499 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2007).  
124. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 552 F. Supp. 951, 954 (N.D.
Calif. 1982). 
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use decisions that involve First Amendment rights. 
a. Plaintiffs’ Beliefs
The Ninth Circuit’s failure to discern a substantial burden in this case 
rests on two slim points:  its narrow, active coercion-based interpretation of 
“substantial burden” and its improper characterization of the Indian 
plaintiffs’ sincere religious beliefs as “feelings and emotions.”  But if 
plaintiffs’ beliefs were properly viewed as sincerely held, rather than 
subjected to the court’s characterization as “feelings and emotions,” the 
substantial burden inquiry would likely be satisfied in this case under any 
construction. 
The First Amendment does not operate to prevent government action 
from affecting an objector’s “spiritual development,” which may be impaired 
where the restriction is justified.125  But the difference between beliefs and 
subjective experience is not always easily discerned.  Justice Brennan 
succinctly summarized this problem in his Lyng dissent.126  He noted that the 
government’s requirement that Native Americans challenging land use 
decisions on religious grounds demonstrate that the restrictions affect 
important or central beliefs and an active coercion into contrary behavior 
assumed that land holds the same spiritual significance for Indian religions 
as it does for other, more widely-followed faiths – essentially, none.127  This 
case is a typical example of such a misperception.  Here, the plaintiffs have 
been compromising their religious practice to accommodate the 
government’s expanding lease of land for ski resort operations for seven 
decades. 
Perhaps it is this fundamental misunderstanding of world views that 
can lead courts to mischaracterize beliefs as feelings and emotions.  But the 
Court is not permitted to evaluate a plaintiff’s sincere beliefs.128  In his Lyng 
dissent, Justice Brennan observed: 
The question for the courts, then, is not whether the Native 
American claimants understand their own religion, but rather 
whether they have discharged their burden of demonstrating, as 
the Amish did with respect to the compulsory school law in Yoder, 
that the land-use decision poses a substantial and realistic threat 
of undermining or frustrating their religious practices.129 
The Ninth Circuit held in Navajo II that the plaintiffs are not restricted 
125. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451.
126. Id. at 474.
127. Id.
128. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218-19; Lyng, 485 U.S. at 475; Smith, 494 U.S. at 906-07
(O’Connor, J. concurring.) 
129. 485 U.S. at 475.
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from access to the Peaks, or prohibited from conducting ceremonies or 
prayers there.130  That is true.  But it misses the point that, regardless of 
continued access, plaintiffs say that once the effluent is dispersed on the 
mountain, their prayers will no longer work and their ceremonies will not be 
effective.131  As Justice Brennan pointed out, it is not the judiciary’s place to 
assume the role of cleric and tell the plaintiffs to the contrary that their 
prayers will still work.132   
Writing for the Ninth Circuit en banc in Navajo II, Judge Bea held that, 
based on factual findings, the Indian plaintiffs’ “mental and emotional 
feelings” were offended by plans to use reclaimed wastewater on the Peaks 
and so reached the conclusion that it is merely the Indians’ “subjective 
spiritual experience” that will be diminished, which would not constitute a 
coercion contrary to their beliefs as required in Lyng and thus – relying on 
the Lyng standard – would not trigger the compelling interest test.133  In a 
footnote, his opinion acknowledges that Lyng was decided before RFRA and 
that RFRA restored the compelling interest test where there is a “substantial 
burden.”134  However, RFRA does not require “coercion” in order to find that 
a burden is substantial.135   
b. The Government’s Interest
Aside from the substantial burden inquiry, there remain two major 
factual differences between this case and Lyng.  The first goes to the nature 
of the burden and the other informs the compelling interest inquiry.  First, 
as discussed above, plaintiffs here are challenging a government action that, 
because it would permit their holiest shrine to be blanketed in artificial 
snow made from reclaimed wastewater, will so defile that shrine as to 
amount to a total prohibition on their religion.  The Lyng court held that the 
government’s proposed road-building in the Six Rivers National Forest may 
have severely restricted, but would not necessarily prohibit plaintiffs’ free 
exercise.136  Second, the burdensome action in Lyng (as well as in Smith and 
Yoder) was an action by the government itself, whereas the proposed action 
in the Coconino National Forest in Navajo II is Forest Service approval of a 
private leaseholder’s action in pursuit of its economic enterprise on public 
lands it leases from the government.   
The second factual distinction informs a consideration of the 
130. 535 F.3d at 1063.
131. Id.; 408 F. Supp. 2d at 887.
132. 485 U.S. at 474.
133. 535 F.3d at 1063.
134. Id. at 1072 n. 13.
135. 2 U.S.C. §2000bb(b)(2).
136. 485 U.S. at 447.
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government’s compelling interest in this case.  True, the government has an 
interest in supporting recreational uses of public land, including skiing, as 
the Forest Service Plan for the Coconino National Forest mandates.  But 
there is already skiing on the Peaks, albeit dependent on the natural 
snowfall.  Skiing is just one of many recreational uses supported by the 
Peaks.137  The Snowbowl is not the only downhill skiing facility in Arizona.138  
Skiing has been ongoing in the Coconino National Forest for seven decades, 
139 so skiing will not necessarily stop if snowmaking with reclaimed 
wastewater does not go forward.  
In light of these facts, the government interest in snowmaking at the 
Snowbowl could more realistically be viewed as the provision of a 
profitability guarantee, or at the least a subsidy, to a private business 
enterprise.  Not surprisingly, the record in this case does not show that the 
Forest Service plan mandates such a use.  If the current proprietor of the ski 
facility is not satisfied with its rate of return on investment relying on 
natural snowfall, it would not seem to be the government’s responsibility to 
guarantee a better return, particularly at the expense of over a quarter of a 
million citizens’ constitutional rights.   
Consequently, it is difficult to view the government interest in a 
privately operated resort’s reliable ski season at the Peaks on a par with the 
government’s own resource management purposes in Lyng, its orderly 
administration of social security benefits in Bowen or the prohibition of a 
controlled substance at issue in Smith.  Likewise, snowmaking with 
reclaimed wastewater would not seem to be the least restrictive means of 
achieving the government’s stated interest of supporting recreational use of 
lands within the Coconino National Forest.  Nor does the government’s 
stated interest in recreational use approach the level of the state 
governments’ interests in fraud prevention and compulsory education raised 
in Sherbert and Yoder.  The Court did not hold the government interests in 
Sherbert and Yoder sufficiently compelling to outweigh those plaintiffs’ 
challenges.  Later, when the Court declined to apply the compelling interest 
test in Lyng and Smith, Congress ultimately affirmed those plaintiffs’ Free 
Exercise rights.  It would seem that the Court could have relied on Sherbert 
and Yoder, as Congress contemplated in RFRA, to protect the Indian 
plaintiffs’ free exercise in this case as well. 
IV. A Missed Opportunity to Clarify the Application of RFRA
to Federal Land Use
The Tenth Circuit has taken a broader view than the Ninth in recent 
137. 535 F.3d at 1064.
138. 408 F. Supp. 2d at 890.
139. 535 F.3d at 1064.
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cases interpreting the nature of a “substantial burden” on free exercise 
under RFRA.  The Comanche trial court declined to follow Navajo II, but rather 
relied on Tenth Circuit cases decided prior to the 2000 amendment of RFRA, 
which eliminated the requirement that a government restriction apply to a 
central belief of the practitioner’s faith in order to constitute a substantial 
burden.140  That court held that the Comanche plaintiffs stated a prima facie 
case for a RFRA violation, that the government had not demonstrated that 
its land use plans were the least restrictive means of accomplishing its 
objective, and it preliminarily enjoined construction of a military training 
support facility on Fort Sill in Oklahoma that would be built within sight of 
the Comanches’ traditional sacred site at the Medicine Bluffs.141  In its 
conclusions of law, the trial court included the observation that “[t]he 
traditional religious practices of the Comanche people are inextricably 
intertwined with the natural environment.”142  On the other hand, the Ninth 
Circuit has since relied on its Navajo II analysis to deny other RFRA plaintiffs’ 
claims.143  In light of this disagreement among the lower courts, the Court 
could have used Navajo II as an opportunity to clarify the proper application 
of RFRA in cases concerning federal land use. 
A. The Establishment Side of the Coin:  Access
Restrictions Are Permissible and Can Serve to Preserve
Religious Use While Facilitating Environmental
Protection.
The lower courts’ treatment of Establishment Clause challenges 
provides additional perspective on federal agency consultation with Indian 
tribes concerning lands of traditional spiritual significance.  In a number of 
cases, government agencies have cooperated with tribes to establish certain 
restrictions on public access so as to preserve the tribes’ free exercise of 
religion.  In these cases, additional outcomes – whether intentional or 
incidental – have generally included increased environmental protection of 
the lands concerned.   
In Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, a group of recreational rock 
climbers objected to the government’s institution of voluntary seasonal 
restrictions on climbing by visitors to the Devil’s Tower National Monument 
140. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73283 at *9-10.
141. Id. at *50.
142. Id.
143. Snoqualmie, 545 F.3d 1207 (FERC re-license of hydroelectric dam at site of
spiritually significant falls on Snoqualmie River approved).  Admittedly, the 
government’s case for establishing a compelling interest in continued operation of 
an existing hydroelectric dam appears significantly stronger than its interest in 
subsidizing new snowmaking at a ski resort, so the Snoqualmie plaintiffs’ RFRA claims 
may have failed even under the Tenth Circuit’s standards. 
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in Wyoming.144  The monument, historically revered by numerous tribes and 
commonly called the Bear Lodge, is a site of tribal religious significance 
where ceremonies are conducted annually.145  The Tenth Circuit held that 
plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the government’s policy as a 
violation of the Establishment Clause, and thus upheld the voluntary 
seasonal ban on climbing.146 
Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service included an Establishment 
Clause challenge by a logging company to the Forest Service decision to 
exclude 23,000 acres of the Bighorn National Forest from logging in order to 
preserve several Plains tribes’ traditional religious use of the Medicine 
Wheel National Monument within the preserved area, after extensive 
consultation with the tribes and other concerned individuals upon receipt of 
comments on the draft EIS.147  The Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court’s 
decision that the plaintiff did not have standing to pursue its Establishment 
Clause claim.148  Against plaintiff’s challenge under the National Forest 
Management Act (“NFMA”) it affirmed that the government’s decision not to 
log a portion of the forest was not arbitrary or capricious under the 
applicable multiple use policy, and therefore did not violate the NFMA.149  
Wyoming Sawmills, like Bear Lodge, illustrates successful cooperation between 
a government agency and affected tribes, where the agency action also 
resulted in preservation of natural resources.150 
144. 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999).
145. Id. at 816.
146. Id. at 822.
147. 383 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2004).  The Medicine Wheel is an 80-foot
diameter prehistoric stone circle with a large center cairn and 28 radiating rock 
spokes. Archeological evidence points to continuous human use of the site for at 
least 7,500 years.  Id. at 1243. 
148. Id. at 1249.
149. Id. at 1252.
150. See also Access Fund, 499 F.3d at 1047 (upholding Forest Service decision to
ban technical rock climbing, but not hiking, and remove unauthorized climbing 
equipment that was installed at Cave Rock, east of Lake Tahoe, a site sacred to the 
Washoe, against an Establishment Clause challenge; the primary purpose of the 
decision was secular, for the preservation of a cultural and historical resource); and 
Natural Arch, 98 Fed. Appx. at 716 (relying on Bear Lodge to deny plaintiffs standing 
and uphold National Park Service policy requesting visitors to voluntarily refrain 
from standing under a natural arch within the Rainbow Bridge National Monument 
that is sacred to the Navajo).  Decades earlier, members of the Navajo Nation failed 
in their attempt to constrain the Bureau of Reclamation’s operation of Glen Canyon 
Dam and Lake Powell so as not to interfere with their free exercise, which they 
alleged was adversely affected by a rise in water level under the Rainbow Bridge site 
and a related increase in tourism (where both effects arguably resulted in significant 
environmental impact to the site as well).  Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 
1980), cert. denied sub nom. Badoni v. Broadbent, 452 U.S. 954 (1981). 
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B. In First Amendment Land Use Disputes - Unlike Other
RFRA Cases - Appellate Courts Have So Far Upheld the
Federal Government’s Actions.
The government’s “right to use what is, after all, its land”151 has so far 
remained intact whenever it is appealed on religious freedom grounds, 
regardless of whether the challenge comes in the guise of Free Exercise or 
Establishment, and regardless of whether the government’s actions 
preserved tribes’ religious access to sacred sites or restricted that religious 
access.  Yet, considering the severity of the restriction in Navajo II and the 
arguably non-compelling nature of the government’s interest in snowmaking 
with reclaimed wastewater at a privately run ski resort, this case could have 
been the situation where the Court decided that RFRA can apply to overturn 
a land use decision by a federal agency.  Expressing doubt that such a day 
may ever come, Judge Fletcher’s dissent in Navajo II echoes the concern 
Justice Brennan raised over twenty years earlier:  “If Indians’ land-based 
exercise of religion is not protected by RFRA in this case, I cannot imagine a 
case in which it will be.”152 
In recent years, the Court revisited factual circumstances similar to 
Smith, when it applied RFRA in relation to another Free Exercise case 
concerning controlled plant substances that are used for religious 
purposes.153  Referencing Smith, and relying primarily on Sherbert, Yoder and 
the text of RFRA, Chief Justice Roberts delivered a unanimous opinion 
holding that the government had failed to demonstrate a compelling 
interest in banning the religious practitioners’ sacramental use of hoasca, a 
plant with hallucinogenic properties.154  Similarly, the Court could have 
taken the opportunity presented by Navajo II to render its opinion concerning 
traditional religious use of sacred sites on federal land post-RFRA. 
V. Protection of Traditional Tribal Uses on Lands of
Cultural or Religious Significance
A generation ago, the United States enacted most of its major 
environmental protection laws, including NEPA,155 the Endangered Species 
Act,156 the Clean Air Act157 and the Clean Water Act.158  NEPA requires all 
151. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453.
152. 535 F.3d at 1113-14 (Fletcher, J., dissenting); see 485 U.S. at 476 (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion stripped Native Americans’ land-
based religious practices of any constitutional protection). 
153. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2005).
154. Id. at 438.
155. 42 U.S.C. §§4321-4370f (1969).
156. 16 U.S.C. §§1531-1544 (1973).
157. 42 U.S.C. §§7401-7671q (1963).
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federal agencies to consider the impact of their activities on the 
environment.159  The Clean Water Act mandates the restoration and 
maintenance of the “chemical, physical and biological integrity of the 
Nation’s waters.”160  With the Endangered Species Act, perhaps the most 
powerful of this quartet of legislation, Congress afforded the conservation of 
endangered plant and animal species and their habitats “the highest 
priority,”161 and granted any citizen the power to sue for enforcement.162 
Enforcement of these statutes can be complicated and contentious, 
and the specter of an economically crippling “wilderness servitude” is often 
raised,163 similar to the Lyng court’s apparent concern that holding for the 
California Indians would have created a “religious servitude” on vast tracts of 
federal property.164  Nonetheless, the people of the United States, through 
Congress’ enactment of our environmental protection laws such as the 
Endangered Species Act, have directed all federal agencies to use their 
authority in order to achieve virtually the same practical result:  clean air, 
clean water and preservation of species and ecosystems on vast tracts of 
public land.165   
Perhaps these environmental statutes could be viewed as our nation’s 
secular codification of principles that also inform indigenous religious land 
use values.  Thus, environmental protection laws, construed in combination 
with our constitutional guarantees of equal protection and personal 
freedom, which are also to be afforded paramount importance,166 as well as 
in combination with specific statutes directed toward Native American 
religious and cultural freedoms, could provide a comprehensive framework 
for guidance in federal land use decisions.  Viewing these statutory schemes 
158. 33 U.S.C. §§1251-1387 (1972).
159. 42 U.S.C. §4332.
160. 33 U.S.C. §1251(a).
161. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978).
162. 16 U.S.C. §1540(g)(1)(A).
163. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983)
(upholding a tribe’s 1864 treaty right to sufficient flow of water in the Klamath River 
to assure the tribe a “modest” living from fishing over a water rights challenge by 
local landowners).  Of course, even sufficient water levels do not guarantee the 
health of the rivers and the salmon population, so the Klamath people (as well as 
commercial and recreational fishing interests) are increasingly threatened by the risk 
of environmental degradation and global warming.  But the future may be brighter, 
since twenty-eight parties (including the operator of hydroelectric dams on the 
Klamath River, tribes, farmers and fishermen) have reached a tentative agreement on 
a dam-removal plan.  Peter Fimrite, Deal to Raze 4 Klamath Dams, S.F. Chronicle, Sept. 
30, 2009 at A1. 
164. 485 U.S. at 452; Id. at 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165. 42 U.S.C. §7401(b); 33 U.S. C. §1251(a); 16 U.S.C §1531(b).
166. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218-219 (1972); Lyng, 485 U.S. at 475; Smith, 494 U.S. at
906-907 (O’Connor, J. concurring).
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in piecemeal fashion has resulted in a number of instances of such narrow 
protection of Native Americans’ rights that a tribe’s existence is 
threatened.167  But interpretation of environmental protection laws and laws 
designed to preserve Native Americans’ fundamental freedoms could be 
harmonized in order to achieve outcomes in compliance with each of the 
statutory mandates.  Because issues can arise concerning environment and 
natural resource use at any level of government,168 policies implementing 
such a statutory harmonization could be effected on a national level as well 
as state and local levels where appropriate.169 
The essence of such a policy would be an instruction to apply 
environmental laws to all federal land management decisions, as required 
under NEPA since the Nixon Administration,170 with concurrent tribal 
consultation regarding traditional religious and cultural practice and in 
conjunction with existing statutes that are directed toward that purpose. 
The policy could affirm that such construction, as to religious freedoms, 
would be conducted in fairness to all faiths under the First Amendment’s 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.  At the same time, the policy 
would afford Native Americans’ religious freedoms the respect and 
meaningful consultation that is easily lost under the current piecemeal 
application of the statutes. 
NASLA was introduced in Congress in 2002, but stalled in 
committee.171  The proposed statute was based on an executive order issued 
by President Clinton toward the end of his second term that mandated 
federal agency consultation with affected tribes concerning land use.172  
Although NASLA would provide a procedure to designate certain lands as 
“sacred” and thus protected in land use decisions, the measure does not 
specifically direct the departments with decision-making responsibility 
167. See, e.g., Navajo II, 535 U.S. at 1063; see also Havasupai Tribe v. U.S., 752 F.
Supp. 1471 (9th Cir. 1990) (uranium mining permitted on federal lands of religious 
importance within traditional tribal territory); contrast Alaska Wilderness League v. 
Kempthorne, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 23861 (9th Cir. 2008) (relying on cases interpreting 
NEPA to find agency consultation was insufficient regarding the impact of proposed 
drilling leases in the Beaufort Sea on local people and wildlife, including Native 
Alaskan subsistence hunting and whaling activities.)   
168. For example, the water rights controversy in Adair began at the state level.
Adair, 723 F.2d at 1397. 
169. In 2003, the California legislature came within three votes of enacting a
comprehensive statutory scheme that covered both public and private lands, and 
would have provided a process to align protection of traditional tribal cultural and 
religious sites with administration of the California Environmental Quality Act.  S.B. 
18, 2003 Leg., 2003-2004 Sess. (Cal. 2003).  See Hon. Barry Goode, A Legislative Approach 
to the Protection of Sacred Sites, 10 Hastings W-Nw. J. Envtl. L. & Pol’y 169 (2004). 
170. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
171. H.R. 5155 107th Cong. (2002).
172. Exec. Order No. 13,007, 3 C.F.R. 196 (1996).
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under environmental statutes to coordinate their efforts in support of this 
goal, nor does it mandate tribal involvement beyond a “‘public-comment”‘ 
style of provision for consultation with tribes.173  The National Congress of 
American Indians (“NCAI”) and other organizations continue to work on 
drafts of NASLA, so it is possible the legislation may resurface in the 
future.174  Adding provisions for construction in conjunction with statutory 
environmental protection goals and for meaningful tribal participation 
would bring NASLA within the scope of the policy proposed here. 
As a baseline, lands of traditional religious significance to Native 
Americans, including entire ecosystems of plant and animal species, should 
remain sufficiently intact to permit traditional cultural and religious uses, or 
where such lands have been severely damaged they should be restored to 
the greatest degree practically possible.  That is the policy the circuit courts 
have upheld in cases like Bear Lodge and Wyoming Sawmills.  Although the 
Court acknowledged the importance of religious freedom with Lyng and 
Smith, it declined to extend protection to preserve Native Americans’ free 
exercise in those cases.  But Congress stepped in, and it provided guidance 
by enacting RFRA.  While the Court could have taken Navajo II as an 
opportunity to clarify RFRA’s application to federal land use, Congress could 
also provide concrete guidance with legislation that includes provisions for 
meaningful tribal consultation and harmonious construction of religious 
freedom and environmental laws in federal land use decisions. 
VI. Conclusion
The Forest Service’s approval of the new Snowbowl EIS should have
been reversed not only because it violates NEPA, but because snowmaking 
with reclaimed wastewater imposes a substantial burden on the Indian 
plaintiffs’ continued free exercise of religion that is prohibited under RFRA. 
The inadequacy of the new EIS was properly raised and argued at trial, and 
the final EIS was indeed inadequate as the three-member panel held in 
Navajo I.  The matter should have been remanded to the Forest Service in 
order for it to take the required “hard look” at those dangers and update the 
EIS accordingly.  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s holding that there is not a 
substantial burden on the tribes’ religious freedom in this case cannot be 
supported.  Had the Indian plaintiffs’ sincere beliefs been accorded 
appropriate deference, the circuit may very well have found a substantial 
burden, even under its narrow, coercion-based construction of RFRA.  But, 
under any construction of the Court’s compelling interest test, the 
government’s interest in subsidizing a private business operation would not 
appear sufficient to outweigh the Indians’ First Amendment rights to free 
173. H.R. 5155 107th Cong. (2002).
174. NCAI Resolution No. ANC-07-020 (adopted June 10, 2007) (supporting
current draft of NASLA). 
 
West  Northwest, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 2010 
303 
exercise of their religion.  Therefore, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Navajo II 
could have been overturned within the bounds of precedent to prohibit 
snowmaking with reclaimed wastewater on the Peaks. 
Congress should provide clear direction that ensures administrative 
agencies engage in consistent land management policies concerning areas 
of traditional religious or cultural significance to Native Americans.  But 
regardless of whether Congress acts, conflicts will continue to arise and 
primary responsibility to articulate the proper application of RFRA in federal 
land use challenges will ultimately rest with the Court.  The Court could 
have used Navajo II to clarify that, while the First Amendment, and thus 
RFRA, does not obligate the government to “control or limit public access to 
public lands in order to facilitate” religious practices,175 neither does it 
permit the prohibition of free exercise of religion absent a compelling prior 
government interest, as the Court explained in the law of Sherbert176 and 
Yoder.177  Thus, as in Bear Lodge, Wyoming Sawmills and other cases, some limits 
may be permissible under appropriate circumstances. 
To ascertain the proper bounds of the government’s compelling 
interest under RFRA, that interest must be balanced on a case-by-case basis 
against any substantial burden it creates.178  Accordingly, in light of the 
substantial burden on the tribes’ daily religious practice in this case, 
declining to approve snowmaking with recycled wastewater could constitute 
a reasonable restriction on the government’s interest.  With Uniao do Vegetal, 
the Court explained the post-Smith application of RFRA to controlled 
substances found in plants that are used for legitimate religious purposes.179  
The time is ripe for a similar lesson concerning RFRA’s proper application to 
land use decisions.  By denying plaintiffs’ petition for certiorari, the Court 
leaves the puzzling impression that RFRA and the religious freedom 
guarantee of the First Amendment on which it is founded apparently do not 
apply to federal land use decisions. 
175. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 552 F. Supp. at 954.
176. 374 U.S. at 403.
177. 406 U.S. at 221.
178. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1); see Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235.
See also Bowen, 476 U.S. at 730-31 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. at 
439. 
179. 546 U.S. at 439.
 
West  Northwest, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 2010 
304 
*  *  *
